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Abstract
Low levels of system inertia in power grids with significant penetration of non-synchronous Renewable Energy Sources
(RES) have increased the risk of frequency instability. The provision of a certain type of ancillary services such as
inertia and Frequency Response (FR) is needed at all times, to maintain system frequency within secure limits if the
loss of a large power infeed were to occur. In this paper we propose a frequency-secured optimisation framework for
the procurement of inertia and FR with diverse dynamics, which enables to apply a marginal-pricing scheme for these
services. This pricing scheme, deduced from a Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program (MISOCP) formulation that
represents frequency-security constraints, allows for the first time to appropriately value multi-speed FR.
Keywords: Convex Optimisation, Frequency Response, Marginal Pricing, Renewable Energy
1. Nomenclature
1.1. Acronyms
ED Economic Dispatch.
EFR Enhanced Frequency Response.
FR Frequency Response.
KKT Karush Kuhn Tucker.
MISOCP Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program.
MSG Minimum Stable Generation.
SOC Second-Order Cone.
PFR Primary Frequency Response.
RES Renewable Energy Sources.
RoCoF Rate-of-Change-of-Frequency.
q-s-s Quasi-steady-state frequency.
UC Unit Commitment.
1.2. Indices
i All-purpose index.
g Index for thermal generators.
1.3. Sets
G Set of thermal generators.
1.4. Functions
∆f(t) Post-fault frequency deviation (Hz).
FR(t) Aggregated system FR (MW).
tnadir Time when the frequency nadir occurs (s).
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tion of this work has been supported by the Engineering and Phys-
ical Sciences Research Council under grants EP/R045518/1 and
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1.5. Decision Variables
(continuous unless otherwise indicated)
λ1, λ2, µ Dual variables for the SOC nadir
constraint.
λR Dual variable for the RoCoF constraint.
λqss Dual variable for the q-s-s constraint.
Pg Power produced by generator g (MW).
PL Largest power infeed (MW).
P curtR RES power curtailed (MW).
Ri FR provision from service i (MW).
Rg FR provision from generator g (MW).
yg Binary variable, commitment decision
for generator g.
1.6. Linear Expressions
(linear combinations of decision variables)
H System inertia (MW·s).
1.7. Parameters
∆fmax Maximum admissible frequency
deviation at nadir (Hz).
cmg Marginal cost of generator g (£/MWh).
cnlg No-load cost of generator g (£/h).
f0 Nominal frequency of the grid (Hz).
Hg Inertia constant of generator g (s).
HL Inertia constant of the generator
producing power PL (s).
PD Total demand (MW).
Pmaxg Maximum power output of generator g
(MW).
Pmsgg Minimum stable generation of
generator g (MW).
Preprint submitted to Applied Energy December 6, 2019
PmaxL Upper bound for the largest power
infeed (MW).
PR Power produced from RES (MW).
Rmaxg FR capacity of generator g (MW).
RoCoFmax Maximum admissible RoCoF (Hz/s).
Ti Delivery time of FR service i (s).
Tdel,i Delay in provision of FR service i (s).
2. Introduction
The increasing penetration of Renewable Energy Sources
(RES) in power grids has brought attention to “frequency
services”, which are ancillary services for the compliance
with frequency regulation. In order to avoid the unex-
pected tripping of Rate-of-Change-of-Frequency (RoCoF)
relays or Under-Frequency Load Shedding, system frequency
must be contained within a narrow band around the nomi-
nal value of 50Hz, in the event of any credible contingency.
It is precisely these frequency services that allow to keep
frequency within secure margins: system inertia, the dif-
ferent types of Frequency Response (FR), and a reduced
largest loss through part-loading large generating units or
cross-country interconnectors [1].
While the cost of operating a traditional power system,
dominated by thermal generators, was mainly driven by
the cost of burning fuel for energy production, modern
RES-dominated power systems show a different behaviour:
the overall cost of operating the grid is reduced, since there
is no fuel-cost associated with RES, but the fraction of
total cost due to providing frequency services has greatly
increased, and could reach more than 10% of overall cost
in some cases [2]. The higher need for frequency services
is driven by the low system inertia levels caused by the
non-synchronous RES, which do not contribute to system
inertia as they are decoupled from the grid through power
electronics converters.
The need for finding methods to efficiently provide fre-
quency services is clear by the ample literature available
on the topic. The impact on FR requirements due to pene-
tration of non-synchronous wind and solar generation was
analysed in [3]. The authors in [4] studied secondary FR
coordination from industrial loads and thermal generators,
while [5] focused on the coordination of electric vehicles
and thermal units to provide response. Studies on the pro-
vision of FR from novel devices are also widely available,
such as [6] for battery storage and [7] for electric vehicles.
A day-ahead market for FR services has recently been
envisioned by National Grid in Great Britain [8]. Although
the scope of this market is to provide FR independently
of the energy market, cost efficiency would be significantly
enhanced by using simultaneous clearing of energy and FR
[9], as well as by introducing novel products such as extra
inertia and a reduced largest-loss. Note that the simul-
taneous clearing of energy and reserve has already been
advocated by several works such as [10]. Rewarding in-
ertia provision has been demonstrated by several studies
[11, 12] to provide significant economic benefits to the sys-
tem, and a synchronous-inertial-response product has been
recently introduced by EirGrid in Ireland [13]. Optimally
scheduling the largest possible loss has also been shown to
achieve both economic and emission savings [1, 14].
In this context, some studies have focused on analysing
market design for frequency services. The two-part pa-
per [11, 15] considered a single Primary Frequency Re-
sponse (PFR) service, while the work in [16] and [17] in-
cluded also Enhanced Frequency Response (EFR). Previ-
ous works mainly apply regression techniques to obtain
linear frequency-security constraints based on dynamic-
simulation data [11, 15] or system operational data [16].
From the linear constraints, they developed a marginal
pricing mechanism for FR services. On the other hand,
the authors in [17] linearised an originally non-linear con-
straint in order to clear a market considering both the EFR
and PFR services. Regarding a market for inertia, refer-
ence [11] used a similar approach as for its proposed market
for PFR, by fitting heuristic linear constraints from simu-
lation data and applying a marginal-pricing scheme to the
linear constraint. Reference [18] only focused on pricing
inertia from the RoCoF constraint, for which an analytical
linear formulation can be obtained.
In this paper, we consider a purely analytical method-
ology to obtain marginal prices for the different frequency
services, namely inertia, different types of FR services with
distinct dynamics, and a reduced largest loss. The pricing
mechanism is deduced from the constraints that guarantee
frequency security, i.e. guarantee that RoCoF, frequency
nadir and frequency quasi-steady-state (q-s-s) are within
acceptable limits. Our formulation can also consider any
combination of activation delays for the different FR ser-
vices, and the impact of this delay on the marginal price is
explicitly reflected. The impact of FR-delays on frequency
stability has been studied in several recent works. The au-
thors in [19] analysed the impact of FR-delays in post-fault
frequency dynamics, by conducting a sensitivity analysis
using dynamic simulations. Reference [20] considered the
delays in the FR dynamics of battery storage, while [21]
focused on the FR dynamics from demand-side response.
The work in [22] developed a delay heuristic that estimates
the post-fault frequency excursion. However, no study has
yet analysed the economic impact of delays on FR mar-
kets.
While most of existing energy markets rely on Linear
programming, for example through DC Optimal Power
Flow, the frequency-security constraints deduced in this
paper are formulated as a Mixed-Integer Second-Order
Cone Program (MISOCP). Second-Order Cones (SOCs)
are the highest class of conic optimisation problems that
can be efficiently solved to global optimality in a mixed-
integer formulation using commercial solvers [23]. There-
fore, an MISOCP formulation is suitable for being imple-
mented in a scheduling algorithm that needs binary vari-
ables to model the on/off state of the generators, such as
the Unit Commitment.
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The contributions of this work are:
1. We propose a marginal pricing scheme for frequency
services (multi-speed FR, inertia and a reduced largest-
loss), based on duality theory applied to the MIS-
OCP formulation that we deduce for guaranteeing
post-fault frequency security. This pricing scheme al-
lows for the first time to optimally value the different
dynamics of FR providers, including the possibility
to consider certain FR services with activation de-
lays, as well as appropriately value a reduced largest
loss.
2. We demonstrate the effectiveness and applicability
of this marginal-pricing methodology through Eco-
nomic Dispatch (ED) and Unit Commitment (UC)
case studies. These studies demonstrate that the
proposed pricing scheme for frequency services puts
in place the right incentives: FR providers are in-
centivised to provide faster FR because they are re-
warded according to their speed of delivery, and RES
generators are incentivised to provide frequency ser-
vices (such as synthetic inertia).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section
3 presents the post-fault frequency security constraints.
These constraints are used in Section 4 to develop the
marginal-pricing scheme for frequency services, while this
pricing scheme is applied to several case studies in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 gives the conclusion.
3. Constraints for Frequency Security
Post-fault frequency dynamics are mathematically de-
scribed by the swing equation [24]:
2H
f0
· d∆f(t)
dt
= FR(t)− PL (1)
Note that load damping has not been included eq. (1),
which entails a conservative assumption used in this paper.
Graphically, the time-evolution of frequency deviation
from nominal value following a large power outage takes
this shape:
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0
∆fmax
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Figure 1: Example of system frequency deviation after a power out-
age. The most extreme case still within frequency-security bound-
aries is shown, where the RoCoF attains the maximum value of
RoCoFmax, and the frequency nadir drops to ∆fmax.
By solving the swing equation, the conditions for re-
specting the RoCoF, nadir and quasi-steady-state limits
can be obtained. To illustrate the procedure for obtain-
ing these conditions, consider the following case with three
FR-services, where the aggregated system Frequency Re-
sponse, FR(t) in (1), is defined as:
FR(t)=


(
R1
T1
+
R2
T2
+
R3
T3
)
· t if t ≤ T1
R1 +
(
R2
T2
+
R3
T3
)
· t if T1 < t ≤ T2
R1 +R2 +
R3
T3
· t if T2 < t ≤ T3
R1 +R2 +R3 if t > T3
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
Function FR(t) is graphically represented in Fig. 2:
T1
T2
T3
R1
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R2
3∑
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Ri
F
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)
t (s)
Total FR
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Figure 2: Time evolution of three distinct FR services that start
ramping up at the very moment of the power outage, t = 0. The
total system FR(t) as defined in eq. (2) is given by the dashed line.
The different FR services in eq. (2) have been mod-
elled using a linear ramp, while the actual dynamics of
FR provided by generators are typically driven by droop
controllers. This linear-ramp assumption for FR allows to
deduce closed-form conditions for the frequency-security
requirements presented in this section, and this assump-
tion was demonstrated in [25] to approximate a real droop
control while still maintaining system security.
The highest RoCoF occurs at t = 0, when the power
imbalance is highest because the power contribution from
Frequency Response is still zero:
|RoCoF(t = 0)| = PL · f0
2 ·H (3)
Therefore, by limiting this highest RoCoF to be below
the RoCoF requirement defined by the system operator,
the following constraint for respecting RoCoF security is
obtained:
PL · f0
RoCoFmax
≤ 2 ·H (4)
In order for frequency to stabilize in a quasi-steady-
state before Secondary and Tertiary Frequency Response
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take frequency back to the nominal 50Hz, the following
q-s-s condition must be met:
R1 +R2 +R3 ≥ PL (5)
Which states that the total amount of FR must be at least
equal to the value of the power outage PL.
Finally, in order to respect all three frequency security
requirements, the frequency nadir must be guaranteed to
be above ∆fmax. Before deducing the condition for nadir
security, it is key to notice that the nadir will occur at
a time-instant tnadir when the RoCoF becomes zero. The
analytical expression for this tnadir can be obtained by solv-
ing the following equation, obtained by setting RoCoF to
zero in the swing eq. (1):
FR(tnadir) = PL (6)
Since three distinct FR services are considered for FR(t)
in (2), the time when the nadir occurs will depend on the
total amount of FR delivered by each service, i.e. it will
depend on the value of R1, R2 and R3. As R1, R2 and
R3 will be decision variables in any optimisation problem
which minimises the cost of frequency services, it is im-
possible to know exactly when the nadir will occur before
solving the optimisation, and therefore every possibility
for nadir must be considered beforehand.
Let’s start by assuming that the nadir happens in the
first time-interval defined in (2), i.e. the time-interval
when t ≤ T1. The power equilibrium defined by (6) must
then happen in that first time-interval, which means that
the following condition holds:
R1 +R2
T1
T2
+R3
T1
T3
> PL (7)
The time within this first time-interval at which nadir is
exactly reached is given by solving (6) for that particular
time-interval:
tnadir =
PL
R1/T1 +R2/T2 +R3/T3
(8)
One last step is necessary for obtaining the constraint
which guarantees nadir security in this first time-interval
t ∈ [0,T1], and it involves obtaining the expression for fre-
quency deviation during that time-interval. This can be
done by solving (1) for t ∈ [0,T1]:
|∆f(t)| = f0
2H
(
PL · t−
3∑
i=1
Ri
2Ti
· t2
)
(9)
Lastly, by substituting t = tnadir into (9) using the expres-
sion in (8), the value of frequency deviation at the nadir
can be deduced:
|∆f(t = tnadir)| = f0
4H
· (PL)
2
R1/T1 +R2/T2 +R3/T3
(10)
In conclusion, by limiting this maximum frequency devia-
tion at the nadir to be below the requirement established
by the system operator, i.e. enforcing |∆f(t = tnadir)| ≤
∆fmax, the constraint for respecting nadir security is ob-
tained. This constraint takes the form:
H
f0
·
(
R1
T1
+
R2
T2
+
R3
T3
)
≥ (PL)
2
4∆fmax
(11)
Remember that in order to obtain (11) we have as-
sumed that the nadir happens during the first time interval
for FR(t), which means that condition (7) holds. However,
the nadir could also occur during any other time-interval
defined in (2): time-interval 2 where t ∈ (T1,T2] or time-
interval 3 where t ∈ (T2,T3]. The nadir constraints that
would apply if the nadir happened in any of these time-
intervals can be deduced by following the same mathemat-
ical procedure described above for time-interval 1. There-
fore, all following constraints, along with the conditions
for each of them to be enforced, must be implemented in
an optimisation problem to guarantee nadir security:
if R1 +R2
T1
T2
+R3
T1
T3
> PL then enforce:
H
f0
·
(
R1
T1
+
R2
T2
+
R3
T3
)
≥ (PL)
2
4∆fmax
(12)
else if R1 +R2 +R3
T2
T3
> PL then enforce:(
H
f0
− R1T1
4∆fmax
)
·
(
R2
T2
+
R3
T3
)
≥ (PL −R1)
2
4∆fmax
(13)
else enforce:(
H
f0
− R1T1 +R2T2
4∆fmax
)
· R3
T3
≥ (PL −R1 −R2)
2
4∆fmax
(14)
The first condition states that the power equilibrium
happens before T1, when none of the three FR services
have finished ramping up by the nadir; the second condi-
tion states that the power equilibrium happens after T1
but before T2, then only FR1 has finished ramping up
by the nadir; finally, the third condition states that the
power equilibrium happens after T2, then both FR1 and
FR2 have finished ramping up (note that the nadir must
always take place before the slowest FR service finishes
ramping up, as otherwise it would be impossible to reach a
power equilibrium and frequency would drop indefinitely).
These conditional constraints (12), (13) and (14), which
are only enforced if their associated condition is met, can
be implemented in an optimisation problem with the use of
auxiliary binary variables, refer to [26] and [27] for further
details.
In conclusion: the RoCoF and q-s-s constraints, (4)
and (5), along with the conditional nadir constraints (12),
(13) and (14), guarantee that system frequency will stay
within the margins defined by the system operator in the
event of a power outage. The feasible space defined by
these five constraints is an MISOCP: (4) and (5) are linear
constraint, while (12), (13) and (14) are rotated SOCs.
The binary variables needed to implement the conditions
in the nadir constraints make the problem an MISOCP.
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Note that a particular case of three FR services with
distinct delivery times has been considered in order to
deduce the frequency-security conditions in this section.
Nevertheless, any number of frequency services could be
considered, and following the same mathematical proce-
dure included in this section, MISOCP constraints would
be obtained.
3.1. Considering time-delays in FR provision
Here we demonstrate that the frequency-security con-
straints deduced in the previous section can also be ob-
tained in MISOCP form for a more general case: the case
in which FR services might be activated some time after
the power outage, i.e. they have an activation time-delay
before starting ramping up. This activation delay would
mean that these FR services do not react to every tiny
frequency deviation from nominal state, therefore reduc-
ing wear and tear for thermal units and greatly decreasing
the number of times that battery storage devices provid-
ing FR switch from charging to discharging mode (and
vice versa).
Consider the case of two distinct frequency services
with also distinct activation delays:
FR(t)=


0 if t ≤ Tdel,1
R1
T1
(t− Tdel,1) if Tdel,1 < t ≤ T1
R1 if T1 < t ≤ Tdel,2
R1 +
R2
T2
(t− Tdel,2) if Tdel,2 < t ≤ T2
R1 +R2 if t > T2
(15.1)
(15.2)
(15.3)
(15.4)
(15.5)
Graphically, these FR services take this shape:
Tdel,1 T1 Tdel,2 T2
R1
R2
R1+R2
F
R
(M
W
)
t (s)
Total FR
FR1
FR2
Figure 3: Time evolution of two distinct FR services, each one with
a different activation time-delay. The total system FR(t) as defined
in eq. (15) is given by the dashed line.
The RoCoF and q-s-s constraints for this case are still
(4) and (5). The nadir constraints can be deduced follow-
ing the same procedure as in Section 3: obtain the ana-
lytical expression for tnadir for each of the time intervals
defined in (15), solve the swing equation (1) for each of
these time-intervals, and finally substitute the expression
for tnadir in the just obtained solution for swing equation.
Following these steps, the conditional nadir constraints for
this case are:
if R1 > PL then enforce:(
H
f0
+
R1 · T2del,1/T1
4∆fmax
)
· R1
T1
≥ (PL +R1 · Tdel,1/T1)
2
4∆fmax
(16)
else enforce:(
H
f0
− R1(T1+2Tdel,1)
4∆fmax
+
R2 · T2del,2/T2
4∆fmax
)
· R2
T2
≥ (PL −R1 +R2 · Tdel,2/T2)
2
4∆fmax
(17)
Note that nadir will never happen at time-interval 1 in
(15) because there is no FR delivered during that interval,
so it is impossible to reach a power equilibrium. Nadir will
also not happen in time-interval 3, because function FR(t)
is constant during that time-interval. Therefore only time-
intervals 2 and 4 in (15) have been considered for deducing
(16) and (17).
Both constraints (16) and (17) are SOCs, and there-
fore the frequency-secured optimisation problem is still
and MISOCP, due to the binary variables introduced by
the conditional statements that enforce either (16) or (17).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that although a partic-
ular case of just two FR services with activation delays has
been considered for deducing (16) and (17), any combina-
tion of FR services with distinct delays would still yield
nadir constraints in SOC form.
4. Marginal-Pricing Scheme for Frequency Services
In this section we propose a settlement mechanism which
assigns shadow prices to the different frequency services so
that an efficient market equilibrium can be obtained. This
settlement is based on maximization of social welfare using
strong duality.
The optimisation problem defined by the frequency-
security constraints contains integer variables, and there-
fore strong duality does not hold. The sources of integral-
ity are two: 1) H , since inertia is a discrete magnitude
dependent on the on/off state of thermal generators; and
2) Binary variables introduced by the conditional state-
ments for the nadir constraints, as in (16) and (17). Here
we propose a methodology to overcome these issues and
allow to define prices for the different frequency services.
Regarding inertia, the approach proposed in [11] is
adopted, consisting on relaxing the integer decision vari-
able to a continuous one. Although this approach would
not lead to a feasible dispatch, a parallel optimisation
maintaining the integrality of H would be run, giving the
optimal dispatch. The relaxed problem would then give
the market settlement allowing to price inertia as a ser-
vice.
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For the auxiliary binary variables in the nadir con-
ditional statements, the following approach is proposed:
first, the original MISOCP is run, which chooses the op-
timal time for nadir to occur by enforcing only one of
the nadir constraints associated with a particular time-
interval; then, a new optimisation is run, including only
the nadir constraint that was chosen in the previous step
and removing any binary variables, therefore yielding a
convex SOCP formulation. Using this approach, strong
duality holds for the resulting convex problem.
The price of each frequency service can be obtained
from the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions of the
frequency-constrained optimisation problem. The price-
term for each service corresponding to the RoCoF (4)
and q-s-s (5) constraints is immediately obtained from
the dual variable of each constraint, since they are linear.
These constraints appear in the Lagrangian with their cor-
responding Lagrange multipliers:
λR
(
PL · f0
RoCoFmax
− 2 ·H
)
(18)
λqss[PL − (R1 +R2)] (19)
For the deduction of the price-terms associated with
the nadir constraint in this section, the two FR services
with activation delays considered in section 3.1 are also
considered. This is because that case allows to present
the most general pricing scheme needed, corresponding to
nadir happening in time-interval 4 of (15): the nadir con-
straint enforced is then (17), for which service FR1 has
finished ramping up while service FR2 is still ramping up.
Therefore, any service that has finished ramping up by the
nadir can be priced in the same way as FR1 in this exam-
ple, while any service still ramping up can be priced as
FR2.
Before deducing the pricing terms associated with con-
straint (17), it must first be re-formulated to be expressed
in standard SOC form [28]:
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

 1f0 −T1−Tdel,14∆fmax T2del,2/T24∆fmax − 1T2 0
0 −1√
∆fmax
Tdel,2/T2√
∆fmax
1√
∆fmax




H
R1
R2
PL


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
[
1
f0
−T1−Tdel,1
4∆fmax
T2
del,2
/T2
4∆fmax
+ 1
T2
0
]
H
R1
R2
PL

 (20)
This constraint appears in the Lagrangian with its re-
spective vector multipliers:
λ1
(
H
f0
−R1T1 +Tdel,1
4∆fmax
+R2
[
T2del,2/T2
4∆fmax
− 1
T2
])
+ λ2
(
PL −R1√
∆fmax
+R2
Tdel,2/T2√
∆fmax
)
− µ
(
H
f0
−R1T1 +Tdel,1
4∆fmax
+R2
[
T2del,2/T2
4∆fmax
+
1
T2
])
(21)
The following constraint must be included in the dual
problem to comply with the KKT condition for dual fea-
sibility, due to using vector dual variables for the SOC:∥∥∥∥λ1λ2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ µ (22)
The KKT stationarity condition is given by the gra-
dient of the Lagrangian. Then, by differentiating the La-
grangian with respect to each frequency service, the cor-
responding price is obtained:
• The price of H would be:
µ− λ1
f0︸ ︷︷ ︸
nadir
+ 2λR︸ ︷︷ ︸
RoCoF
(23)
• The price of PL is:
− λ2√
∆fmax︸ ︷︷ ︸
nadir
− λR · f0
RoCoFmax︸ ︷︷ ︸
RoCoF
− λqss︸ ︷︷ ︸
q-s-s
(24)
Note that the price for PL would be negative since
a larger loss would increase the cost for ancillary-
service provision.
• The price of an FR service which has finished ramp-
ing up by nadir (as FR1 in this example) is given by:
λ2√
∆fmax
− (µ− λ1)T1 +Tdel,1
4∆fmax︸ ︷︷ ︸
nadir
+ λqss︸ ︷︷ ︸
q-s-s
(25)
Therefore the value of the service decreases with in-
creasing delivery time and increasing delay. In other
words, the service becomes less valuable as its dy-
namics are slower.
• The price of FR services still ramping up by the nadir
(as FR2 in this example) is given by:
(µ+ λ1)
1
T2
+ (µ− λ1)
T2del,2/T2
4∆fmax
− λ2Tdel,2/T2√
∆fmax︸ ︷︷ ︸
nadir
+ λqss︸ ︷︷ ︸
q-s-s
(26)
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The pricing methodology proposed in this section ap-
plies to any convex optimisation problem which includes
the frequency-security constraints deduced in Section 3,
including the case in which the energy and FR markets
are cleared simultaneously.
4.1. Discussion on uplift
The inherent non-convexities in power systems, where
the commitment decision of thermal units is forcibly a bi-
nary variable, makes it impossible to apply duality the-
ory even to price energy in electricity markets. This issue
has been studied in the literature and several approaches
have been proposed to overcome this challenge and obtain
marginal prices for energy [29]:
• Dispatchable model, where the commitment decision
of thermal units is relaxed from binary to continuous,
as used in the present paper.
• Restricted model, which consist on first running the
original mixed-integer problem, then running a sec-
ond optimisation relaxing the commitment decision
but using equality constraints to force the commit-
ment variables to take the same value as in the so-
lution of the original, mixed-integer problem. Some
studies have observed that this model can lead to
high volatility of energy prices [28].
• Convex hull approach, which consists on substitut-
ing the original mixed-integer problem by its convex
hull, i.e. the tightest possible convex relaxation of
the original problem. The authors in [29] argue that
this approach provides the smallest make-whole pay-
ments, while computing the convex hull of a problem
is a very computationally-intensive task.
This is still an active area of research, as no method has
been proven to be superior in all instances for the pricing
of “uplift” (some very recent publications on the matter
are available [30]). The term “uplift” refers to the pay-
ments that must be made to certain generators in order
to compensate for the negative revenue that they might
obtain at times, given that the energy prices only support
the optimal solution in the simplified, convex model where
they are derived from, but not in the original non-convex
model that more accurately represents the real power sys-
tem.
Since the pricing of uplift is inherently related to the
non-convexities in a power system and not just related
to inertia, it is out of the scope of the present paper to
study uplift in detail. Therefore, we have opted to use the
dispatchable model for allowing to price inertia, as was
proposed in [11]. However, our pricing formulation could
also be applied if any of the other methods for pricing uplift
is considered. Future work should study the implications
of other uplift-pricing models for the co-optimisation of
energy and frequency services.
5. Case Studies
In this section we carry out several frequency-secured
ED and UC optimisations, to demonstrate the applica-
bility and implications of our proposed marginal-pricing
methodology for frequency services. These optimisation
problems, formulated as MISOCPs due to the conditional
nadir constraints, were implemented in YALMIP [31], an
optimisation modelling layer for MATLAB, while the low-
level numerical computations were solved by calling com-
mercial solver Gurobi. The code used for solving these
examples is available in this link.
In these studies, the different generators submit a bid
for providing energy to the market operator, and the mar-
ket clearing consists on minimising total system costs. There
is no explicit bid for inertia or FR provision. The frequency-
security requirements are set to RoCoFmax = 1Hz/s and
∆fmax = 0.8Hz.
5.1. Value of single-speed FR
This section demonstrates that if there are no distinct
speeds for FR, the pricing scheme for the single FR service
is equivalent to that of reserve: generators simply recover
their opportunity cost. This study is based on Example
6.7 in [9], which demonstrates that by using the dual vari-
able from the reserve constraint in a simultaneous clearing
of the energy and reserve markets, all the generators would
recover the opportunity cost from limiting their power out-
put due to providing reserve.
To illustrate this point, we run a single-time-period
ED, simultaneously clearing the energy and FR markets.
The optimisation problem is formulated as:
min
∑
g∈G
cmg · Pg (27)
s.t.
∑
g∈G
Pg = PD (28)
0 ≤ Pg ≤ Pmaxg ∀g ∈ G (29)
0 ≤ Rg ≤ Rmaxg ∀g ∈ G (30)
0 ≤ Rg ≤ Pmaxg − Pg ∀g ∈ G (31)
RoCoF constraint
Nadir constraints
q-s-s constraint
Constraint (28) enforces the power balance, (29) enforce
generation limits, (30) enforce FR-provision limits, and
(31) limits FR provision to be below the headroom of each
generator.
The characteristics of generators participating in the
energy and FR markets are given in Table 1.
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Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power range (MW) 100-100 0-400 0-300
Number of Units 1 5 5
FR capacity (MW) 0 225 175
Energy bid (£/MWh) 15 17 18
Inertia constant (s) 6 6 6
FR delivery time (s) N/A 10 10
Table 1: Characteristics of thermal generators
All generators willing to provide FR are assumed to
provide Primary Frequency Response with a delivery time
of 10s, which was the only FR service defined by National
Grid in Great Britain until 2016. The largest possible out-
age is driven by the largest single plant, the nuclear unit,
therefore setting PL = P
max
L = 100MW. Note that there
are 5 units of Generators type 1, therefore each of them
has a rating of 80MW. Similarly, 5 units of Generators
type 2 are available, with a 60MW-rating each.
Some further clarifications on Table 1: for the sake
of simplicity, we choose zero Minimum Stable Generation
(MSG) for all generators, to better illustrate the pricing
of FR services (zero MSG was also used in Example 6.7
in [9]). Also for clarity, we consider fixed system inertia;
however, the co-optimisation of inertia and FR is possible
with our model, and will be demonstrated in a UC example
in Section 5.5.
Since both types of generators 1 and 2 in Table 1 have
the same FR delivery-time of 10s, the nadir constraint is:
R1 ≥ (PL)
2 · T1 · f0
4∆fmax ·H = 372MW (32)
Which is equivalent to a fixed reserve requirement, such
as Reserve ≥ 372MW.
The results for a low-demand case of PD = 250MW are
presented in Table 2:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power produced (MW) 100 150 0
FR provided (MW) 0 197 175
Revenue from energy (£) 1700 2550 0
Revenue from FR (£) 0 0 0
Profit (£) 200 0 0
Energy price (£/MWh) 17
FR price (£/MW) 0
Table 2: Solution of the frequency-secured ED for the system in
Table 1, for a low-demand case of PD = 250MW.
The energy price has been calculated using the dual
variable of the power-balance constraint (28), and the FR
price comes from the dual variable of (32). Profit has been
calculated assuming a competitive market in which energy
bids are equal to marginal costs.
In this low-demand case, since FR is provided for free
and all the energy can be provided by the cheapest Gen-
erators type 1, the price for FR is of £0/MW. However, if
the demand increases to reach PD = 400MW, the clearing
prices change:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power produced (MW) 100 203 97
FR provided (MW) 0 197 175
Revenue from energy (£) 1800 3654 1746
Revenue from FR (£) 0 197 175
Profit (£) 300 400 175
Energy price (£/MWh) 18
FR price (£/MW) 1
Table 3: Solution of the frequency-secured ED for the system in
Table 1, for a high-demand case of PD = 400MW.
Now that the demand has increased, Generators type 2
start providing energy, so that Generators type 1 can still
provide 197MW of FR (because the FR provision from
Generators type 2 is capped at 175MW). The price of
FR becomes £1/MW while the price of energy is now of
£18/MW, so Generators type 1 are indifferent to provid-
ing FR or selling more energy: if they are part-loaded to
provide FR, they recover the opportunity cost of not pro-
viding as much energy as they could.
This study has demonstrated that if a single FR service
is defined, as was common practice in Great Britain until
recently, the same principles as for reserve pricing could be
applied, since there was no significant difference between
the single-speed FR and reserve. However, the following
section will demonstrate the need for a marginal-pricing
scheme tailored for FR if multi-speed FR services are to
be recognised by the operator.
5.2. Value and incentives for multi-speed FR
The case study presented here will demonstrate the dif-
ference between marginal-pricing for reserve and marginal-
pricing for FR when more than one FR service is available.
Now let’s consider the same system as in Section 5.1,
but assuming that Generators Type 1 can actually provide
FR in 7s, and therefore they increase their energy bid to
£19/MWh due to providing this faster FR service (they
then become the most expensive generators):
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Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power range (MW) 100-100 0-400 0-300
Number of Units 1 5 5
FR capacity (MW) 0 225 175
Energy bid (£/MWh) 15 19 18
Inertia constant (s) 6 6 6
FR delivery time (s) N/A 7 10
Table 4: Characteristics of thermal generators. The only different
parameters with respect to Table 1 are given in bold font.
The results for a demand of PD = 400MW are pre-
sented in Table 5:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power produced (MW) 100 50.6 249.4
FR provided (MW) 0 225 50.6
Revenue from energy (£) 1900 961.4 4738.6
Revenue from FR (£) 0 315 50.6
Profit (£) 400 315 300
Energy price (£/MWh) 19
FR1 price (£/MW) 1.4
FR2 price (£/MW) 1
Table 5: Solution of the frequency-secured ED for the system in
Table 4, for a demand of PD = 400MW.
After solving the ED optimisation, one can verify that
the enforced nadir constraint in this case is:
R1
T1
+
R2
T2
≥ (PL)
2 · f0
4∆fmax ·H (33)
Simplifying the above constraint:
1.4 ·R1 +R2 ≥ 372MW (34)
These results show that Generators type 2 are com-
pensated for their part-loading by the payment for FR2,
therefore they recover their opportunity cost. On the other
hand, Generators type 1 increase their revenue from pro-
viding the faster service FR1 than if they were fully loaded
to sell more energy. This demonstrates that fast provision
of FR is incentivised under the proposed marginal-pricing
scheme: FR providers can make a profit from providing
faster FR, not simply recover the opportunity cost. Oth-
erwise, there would be no incentive for FR providers to
achieve faster delivery of FR. This is the key difference
between reserve and FR: the speed of delivery of FR mat-
ters (while the dynamics of reserve do not matter), and
that speed is reflected in the marginal pricing for FR that
we propose. Therefore our methodology puts the right
incentives in place to reduce whole system costs, as gen-
erators are incentivised to provide faster FR and that in
turn benefits the whole system.
5.3. Incentive for reducing FR activation delays
Here we study the impact of an activation delay in the
value of an FR service, for which we use the same system
as in Table 4 but considering that service FR1 now has a
0.4 delay, i.e. Tdel,1 = 0.4s.
The results for a demand of PD = 400MW are pre-
sented in Table 6:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power produced (MW) 100 143.5 156.5
FR provided (MW) 0 225 143.5
Revenue from energy (£) 1900 2726.5 2973.5
Revenue from FR (£) 0 222.7 143.5
Profit (£) 400 222.7 300
Energy price (£/MWh) 19
FR1 price (£/MW) 0.99
FR2 price (£/MW) 1
Table 6: Solution of the frequency-secured ED for the system in
Table 4, for a demand of PD = 400MW. Service FR1 has a 0.4s
activation delay in this case.
The enforced nadir constraint in this case is:(
H
f0
+
R1 · T2del,1/T1
4∆fmax
)
·
(
R1
T1
+
R2
T2
)
≥
(PL +R1 · Tdel,1/T1)2
4∆fmax
(35)
The price of service FR1 has dropped to £0.99/MW,
making FR1 less valuable than FR2 although the deliv-
ery time of FR2 is still longer than T1, but FR2 still has
no delay. Due to the 0.4s activation delay, the profit of
Generators type 1 has decreased by 29% compared to the
results in Table 5, which demonstrates how FR providers
are incentivised to reduce their activation delay with our
marginal-pricing methodology.
5.4. Value of a reduced largest-loss
Now we analyse the value of a reduced largest-loss: the
value from part-loading the nuclear unit in order to reduce
the need for FR. Note that this value of PL is set by the
power output of the nuclear unit in this system, since the
nuclear plant drives the largest power infeed.
The largest possible outage can now be reduced by
part-loading the nuclear unit: although this unit provides
the cheapest energy, by part-loading it a lower amount of
FR is needed, and therefore lower overall system costs in
the simultaneous clearing of the energy and FR markets
may be achieved.
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Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power range (MW) 90-100 0-400 0-300
Number of Units 1 5 5
FR capacity (MW) 0 200 150
Energy bid (£/MWh) 15 19 18
Inertia constant (s) 6 6 6
FR delivery time (s) N/A 7 10
Table 7: Characteristics of thermal generators. The only different
parameter with respect to Table 4 is given in bold font.
The results are presented in Table 8:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power produced (MW) 93 7 300
FR provided (MW) 0 225 0
Revenue from energy (£) 1767 133 5700
Revenue from reduced-PL (£) 28 - -
Revenue from FR (£) 0 186.8 0
Profit (£) 400 186.8 300
Energy price (£/MWh) 19
Reduced-PL price (£/MW) 4
FR1 price (£/MW) 0.83
FR2 price (£/MW) 0.58
Table 8: Solution of the frequency-secured ED for the system in
Table 7, for a high-demand case of PD = 400MW.
The nadir constraint enforced in this case is:
H ·
(
R1
T1
+
R2
T2
)
≥ (PL)
2 · f0
4∆fmax
(36)
The results in Table 8 demonstrate that large nuclear
units would recover their opportunity cost from being part-
loaded, since the price for this service obtained from the
vector dual-variables of the SOC constraint (36) is £4/MW,
which is the difference between the energy price and the
nuclear’s energy bid. Generators type 1 still make a profit
from providing fast FR in 7s.
A note of caution is necessary, since the payment for a
reduced loss might introduce a perverse incentive for large
units. To illustrate this point, let’s now consider a case
for which the marginal-value of a reduced-PL is actually
higher than the opportunity cost for the nuclear unit due
to being part-loaded. Consider the system in Table 9:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power range (MW) 95-100 0-400 0-300
Number of Units 1 5 5
FR capacity (MW) 0 200 150
Energy bid (£/MWh) 15 19 18
Inertia constant (s) 6 6 6
FR delivery time (s) N/A 7 10
Table 9: Characteristics of thermal generators. The only different
parameter with respect to Table 7 is given in bold font.
The results for this system are shown in Table 10:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power produced (MW) 95 19.3 285.7
FR provided (MW) 0 225 14.3
Revenue from energy (£) 1805 366.7 5428.3
Revenue from reduced-PL (£) 35.5 - -
Revenue from FR (£) 0 315 14.3
Profit (£) 415.5 315 300
Energy price (£/MWh) 19
Reduced-PL price (£/MW) 7.1
FR1 price (£/MW) 1.4
FR2 price (£/MW) 1
Table 10: Solution of the frequency-secured ED for the system in
Table 9, for a high-demand case of PD = 400MW.
All the part-loading allowed is used in this case, so the
nuclear unit would make a higher profit from part-loading
than if it were to sell all the energy possible. If the nuclear
unit would collect the price of this “reduced-loss” service,
a perverse incentive would be created: the nuclear plant
could benefit by making things worse for the whole system,
i.e. by aiming for a high MSG that would increase the
need for frequency services. One way of doing so would be
for example to submit a higher-than-truthful MSG to the
system operator.
This unwanted incentive can be avoided if the nuclear
unit only gets compensated for the opportunity cost of
not selling all available power in the energy market, in-
stead of being compensated from the marginal value of
PL. The value of this opportunity cost can be easily cal-
culated from the difference between the marginal price for
energy and the marginal cost of the nuclear unit. By col-
lecting this revenue, nuclear units do not need to receive
an out-of-market payment, since they would recover their
high investment just as planned (as they were conceived as
must-run units providing base load at all times) but never
make a perverse profit.
Note that the value of nuclear part-loading in a real sys-
tem would be limited by the ramp rates of the nuclear fleet,
since typically a large nuclear unit would have to be part-
loaded several hours in advance, as shown in our previous
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work [32]. We have limited ourselves to a single-period
market clearing in these examples for the sake of clarity,
but the marginal-pricing formulation presented here could
be directly applied to a multi-period market clearing.
5.5. Value and incentives for inertia
In this section we run several frequency-constrained
UCs, so that the co-optimisation of inertia along with
other frequency services can be analysed. System inertia
is inherently related to the commitment state of thermal
generators, and can be calculated with the following ex-
pression:
H =
∑
g∈G
Hg · Pmaxg · yg − PmaxL ·HL (37)
Which considers that the largest unit won’t contribute to
system inertia after an outage.
The formulation of the single-period UC with frequency
constraints used here is as follows:
min
∑
g∈G
cnlg · yg + cmg · Pg (38)
s.t.
∑
g∈G
Pg + PR − P curtR = PD (39)
yg · Pmsgg ≤ Pg ≤ yg · Pmaxg ∀g ∈ G (40)
0 ≤ Rg ≤ yg · Rmaxg ∀g ∈ G (41)
0 ≤ Rg ≤ Pmaxg − Pg ∀g ∈ G (42)
0 ≤ P curtR ≤ PR (43)
RoCoF constraint
Nadir constraints
q-s-s constraint
Constraint (39) enforces the power balance, (40) enforce
generation limits, (41) enforce FR-provision limits, (42)
limits FR provision to be below the headroom of each
generator, and constraint (43) limits RES curtailment to
be below RES generation. In this UC we consider the
economic inefficiencies of a part-loaded generator through
their MSG and no-load cost.
As explained in Section 4, the procedure to apply the
marginal-pricing scheme and overcome the integrality of
the UC is: 1) Solve the Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone
UC; 2) Solve again, relaxing the commitment decision for
generators from binary to continuous and enforcing only
the nadir constraint chosen in step 1, so that the problem
becomes convex and therefore marginal prices can be com-
puted. The marginal prices can be obtained for the dual
variables of the problem in step 2, while the feasible op-
erating solution is given by the original MISOCP problem
in step 1.
The details of the system used for these case studies
are shown in Table 11:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Power range per unit
(MW)
1800-1800 250-500 75-150
Number of Units 1 30 30
No-load cost cnlg (£) 0 500 500
Marginal cost cmg
(£/MWh)
10 95 50
Inertia constant (s) 5 5 5
FR delivery time (s) N/A 7 10
Table 11: Characteristics of thermal generators.
The solution of the frequency-secured UC for a low-
RES-generation case is given in Table 12. RES are as-
sumed to have a zero marginal cost (i.e. cmg =£0/MWh).
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Online units 1 24 30
Power produced (GW) 1.8 7.7 4.5
FR provided (GW) 0 4.3 0
Operating cost (£k) 18 743.5 240
Revenue from energy (£k) 172.4 737.6 431
Profit from energy (£k) 154.4 -5.9 191
Total revenue (£k) 172.8 743.4 431.9
Total profit (£k) 154.8 -0.1 191.9
Energy price (£/MWh) 95.79
Inertia price (£/MWs) 0.041
FR1 price (£/MW) 0.79
FR2 price (£/MW) 0.55
RES accommodated (GW) 10GW (0GW curtailed)
Table 12: Solution of the frequency-secured UC for the system in Ta-
ble 11, for a demand case of PD = 24GW and a low-RES-generation
case of PR = 10GW.
The enforced nadir constraint in these cases is:
H ·
(
R1
T1
+
R2
T2
)
≥ (PL)
2 · f0
4∆fmax
(44)
These results illustrate that the prices for frequency
services would be small in a low-RES-generation condi-
tion, since the thermal units are online to cover the net
demand (demand minus RES-generation) and therefore
frequency services become a by-product of energy produc-
tion. It is interesting to notice that a make-whole pay-
ment would be necessary for Generators type 1, and this
make-whole payment would be much higher if generators
were not compensated for inertia and FR (the difference in
make-whole payments can be obtained from comparing the
profit from energy with the total profit). Although pricing
uplift, which is the cause for make-whole payments, is out
of the scope of this work, this example demonstrates that
remunerating generators for these ancillary services would
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reduce the amount of make-whole payments, a conclusion
that was also reached in [15].
Now let’s analyse the incentives for higher inertia pro-
vision, by increasing the inertia constant of Generators
type 2 to 6s:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Online units 1 24 30
Power produced (GW) 1.8 7.7 4.5
FR provided (GW) 0 4.1 0
Operating cost (£k) 18 743.5 240
Revenue from energy (£k) 172.4 737.7 431.1
Profit from energy (£k) 154.4 -5.8 191.1
Total revenue (£k) 172.8 743.4 432.2
Total profit (£k) 154.8 -0.1 192.2
Energy price (£/MWh) 95.80
Inertia price (£/MWs) 0.039
FR1 price (£/MW) 0.81
FR2 price (£/MW) 0.56
RES accommodated (GW) 10GW (0GW curtailed)
Table 13: Solution of the frequency-secured UC for the system in
Table 11, but considering that the inertia constant of Gen. type 2
is increased to 6s. The demand level is set to PD = 24GW and a
low-RES-generation case of PR = 10GW is considered, same as for
the results shown in Table 12.
The results show that Generators type 2 slightly in-
crease their revenue due to increasing their inertia con-
stant, but this increase is indeed very small, of roughly
0.1% of the total profit. However, the incentives for iner-
tia provision will become clear in a high-RES-generation
case, for which the results are presented in Table 14:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Online units 1 17 27
Power produced (GW) 1.8 4.25 2.05
FR provided (GW) 0 4.25 2
Operating cost (£k) 18 412.2 116
Revenue from energy (£k) 0 0 0
Profit from energy (£k) -18 -412.2 -116
Total revenue (£k) 41.4 413.1 166.7
Total profit (£k) 23.4 0.9 50.7
Energy price (£/MWh) 0
Inertia price (£/MWs) 4.6
FR1 price (£/MW) 51.2
FR2 price (£/MW) 35.9
RES accommodated (GW) 15.9GW (2.1GW curtailed)
Table 14: Solution of the frequency-secured UC for the system in Ta-
ble 11, for a demand case of PD = 24GW and a high-RES-generation
case of PR = 18GW.
Note that in this high-RES-generation case the price of
energy drops to £0/MWh due to RES curtailment, since
the next MWh of energy could be provided by RES for free.
Therefore, all the operating cost of the system is related
to the cost of frequency services. The price of inertia has
increased by more than a factor 100 compared to the low-
RES condition in Table 12, while the prices of FR1 and
FR2 have increased by a factor 65.
Table 14 also shows that all generating units are oper-
ating at MSG, which illustrates the main driver for RES
curtailment in a low-inertia system: since thermal genera-
tors providing inertia and FR must be online generating at
least MSG, the sum of MSG-energy from all these sources
results in RES curtailment of an equivalent value. Regard-
ing the need for a make-whole payment for Generators type
1, it has been completely eliminated by the compensation
for inertia and FR.
Let’s again increase the inertia constant of Generators
type 2 to 6s, to understand the incentives for higher inertia
provision:
Nuclear Gen.
type 1
Gen.
type 2
Online units 1 16 28
Power produced (GW) 1.8 4 2.1
FR provided (GW) 0 4 2.1
Operating cost (£k) 18 388 119
Revenue from energy (£k) 0 0 0
Profit from energy (£k) -18 -388 -119
Total revenue (£k) 39.6 388.4 188.8
Total profit (£k) 21.6 0.4 69.8
Energy price (£/MWh) 0
Inertia price (£/MWs) 4.4
FR1 price (£/MW) 53.1
FR2 price (£/MW) 37.1
RES accommodated (GW) 16.1GW (1.9GW curtailed)
Table 15: Solution of the frequency-secured UC for the system in
Table 11, but considering that the inertia constant of Gen. type 2
is increased to 6s. The demand level is set to PD = 24GW and a
high-RES-generation case of PR = 18GW is considered, same as for
the results shown in Table 14.
The profit for Generators type 2 has increased by 38%
due to increasing their inertia constant by 1s. Further-
more, RES curtailment has been reduced by 0.2GW due
to this extra inertia, when compared to the results in Table
14.
In conclusion, our pricing scheme promotes higher pro-
vision of inertia, which can greatly increase the revenue
for generators during high-RES-generation conditions. In
turn, the whole system would benefit from a lower RES
curtailment, which would reduce overall costs. This also
promotes investment in RES that provide services such
as synthetic inertia, as they could achieve a revenue even
during periods of RES curtailment when the energy price
drops to £0/MWh, potentially eliminating the need for
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feed-in tariffs since the uncertainty in revenues for RES
would be reduced.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Following the deduction of Mixed-Integer Second-Order
Cone Programming (MISOCP) frequency-security constraints
for low-inertia power systems, this paper has proposed
a marginal-pricing scheme for frequency services such as
inertia, different types of FR and a reduced largest-loss.
Through several simple case studies, we demonstrate that
the proposed marginal-pricing methodology for frequency
services puts in place the right incentives: providers have
been shown to be incentivised to increase their inertia
and achieve faster delivery of FR, as they are rewarded
according to their speed of delivery. In addition, this
methodology could promote investment in Renewable En-
ergy Sources (RES) that provide frequency services, as
they would collect revenue even during times of RES cur-
tailment. We further demonstrate that large nuclear units
would recover their opportunity cost from being part-loaded,
but we also warn against possible perverse incentives and
how to mitigate them.
Three main lines for future work can be identified.
First, a methodology should be defined to map the com-
plex Frequency Response (FR) dynamics in a real power
system, driven usually by droop controllers, into a ramp
defined by the three parameters Ri, Ti and Tdel,i. This
methodology would allow providers of frequency services
to simply submit these three parameters to the system
operator, who then could simultaneously clear the energy
and FR markets using our proposed pricing formulation.
Second, integrating the contribution from load damping
into the frequency-security constraints should be investi-
gated, as previous works have identified that load damping
can provide important economic savings for the provision
of frequency services [32]. Third, the implications of other
uplift-pricing methodologies should be investigated, as the
present work has considered the dispatchable model, which
relaxed the commitment decision of generators, in order to
obtain marginal prices for frequency services.
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